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THE RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT ACT 1991 
& THE wILDLIFE ACT 
1953
Recent case law has drawn attention to the impact of the Wildlife Act 1953 (WA) 
and its intersection with the Resource 
Management Act 1991 (RMA). Some 
of the decisions have been summarised 
in previous RMLA publications and 
it is the intention of this article to 
examine more closely aspects of those 
cases. A particular focus is the use of 
review conditions related to wildlife in 
resource consents and the role of an 
Assessment of Environmental Effects 
(AEE). 
The effect of the WA is to provide 
for the protection of wildlife and to 
regulate the hunting of game. The Act 
deems wild animals to be absolutely 
protected unless scheduled as game, 
partially protected, or not protected 
animals. Wildlife sanctuaries and 
reserves can also be created under the 
Act. Where the absolutely or partially 
protected status applies, permission 
must be obtained from the Department 
of Conservation, in order to hunt or kill 
the animal pursuant to s53. To fail to 
do so, constitutes an offence pursuant 
to s63(1). The restrictions are wide 
ranging and those listed in s63(1)
(c) include disturbing, destroying or 
possessing a nest of protected wildlife 
or game. The definition of hunt or kill 
includes taking, as a result of which any 
method of taking, catching or pursuing 
is also captured by the provision.
Potentially included in these definitions 
is the concept of incidental take, where 
wild animals are killed or taken, or 
their nests interfered with during a 
development activity or vegetation 
removal operation. Fortunately the 
average mynah, rat or opossum and 
many other common introduced 
animals are excluded from protection 
by way of Schedules to the WA. If 
however, the intention is to destroy 
habitat or disturb the nest of fauna 
such as kokako, tui or gecko, a WA 
permit will need to be obtained from 
the Department of Conservation. In 
practice such permits are generally 
obtained in large-scale operations such 
as forestry applications, where the 
habitat of an iconic species is known to 
be affected. When the resource consent 
to fell is lodged with the council, a copy 
is usually provided to the Department 
of Conservation which can make 
recommendations as to procedures to 
follow. 
THE CASE OF THE MOKO 
SKINK
A recent example of the discovery of 
the moko skink, during development 
of the Whangamata marina is a 
cautionary tale. The decision in Gunson 
v Waikato Regional Council unreported, 
Environment Court, 4 December 
2008, A134/2208, Bollard J., records 
the facts. Over a period of a more than 
a decade, the Whangamata Marina 
Society sought and obtained a range 
of resource consents to develop an 
extensive marina at Whangamata, 
Coromandel Peninsula. The consents 
contained extensive conditions 
regulating development activities in 
order to avoid, remedy or mitigate 
adverse effects. In terms of fauna, 
there were particular concerns relating 
to birds such as the banded rail and 
the dotterel. As a condition of one of 
the coastal permits for reclamation, a 
fauna management plan was required 
to be completed.
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Pursuant to the consent, the 
fauna management plan was to be 
completed prior to construction work 
commencing. When this plan was 
prepared it recommended surveying 
a particular area for reptiles and the 
decision records that the presence 
of moko skink became known to 
the Marina Society in March 2007. 
The presence of the skink at the site 
had not been alluded to in evidence 
of ecologists before the Court, in the 
previous marina appeal brought by iwi 
bodies representing tangata whenua 
interests. No clear finding was made 
in Gunson as to when the moko skink 
occupied the particular site. The 
possibility of migration to the salt 
marsh site post consent was raised.
Although works were not to have 
commenced on the site prior to 
completion of the fauna management 
plan, through miscommunication, 
kikuyu grass and pampas vegetation 
associated with the skink’s habitat 
needs, had been sprayed with 
herbicide in various locations within 
the site.
In this situation, the Department of 
Conservation responded to require 
permits under the WA to be obtained, 
in order to put into place immediate 
measures to protect the species. 
Subsequently, the applicant sought 
interim enforcement proceedings 
in the Environment Court, to the 
effect that the Marina Society obtain 
resource consents to damage/destroy 
the habitat of the species and that 
the Regional Council require this. 
The application was unsuccessful. 
The Environment Court considered 
the chain of events, the actions taken 
and the WA permits obtained and 
determined that the likely effects 
on the environment would not be 
adverse to the point that would justify 
intervention of the Court. 
A pragmatic decision such as this 
may provide welcome relief to the 
conscientious developer caught 
unawares by the presence of a 
secretive species. Yet it treads a path 
that may not be completely beneficial 
to absolutely protected species. The 
moko skink case clearly highlights 
the things that can go wrong. Set out 
below are a series of issues that require 
further thought in terms of managing 
these processes. The issues are not all 
necessarily in reference to the Gunson 
decision, which had its own particular 
set of circumstances.
The case highlights the importance of 
a rigorous AEE, with careful ecological 
assessment, in terms of protecting 
the environment and providing for 
smooth process for the applicant. 
Had the skink been detected from the 
outset, its position could have been 
protected by conditions of consent, 
together with conditions attached to a 
WA permit. To be fair to the applicant 
in this case, there is an inference in 
the decision that the skink may not 
have been present to find in the area, 
at the time of the original assessment 
and should that be the case, then 
such problems are inevitable. In this 
instance the safeguard of a condition 
requiring the preparation of a fauna 
management plan proved invaluable 
to the survival of the skink in this 
habitat. A more rigorous approach 
would require the preparation of 
a fauna management plan as part 
of an AEE, and when there is to be 
a lengthy delay between consent 
and construction, a requirement 
for resurvey of the area in terms of 
protected species. It is accepted that 
such an approach may add to cost 
and delay, but it can be argued that 
the cost, delay, disruption and damage 
to species of not taking this action, 
outweighs the initial expense of 
resurvey.
Is a fauna survey/management plan 
required as a condition of consent 
necessarily the best method to 
approach this problem? A condition 
to be given effect to prior to the 
start of development works, carries 
less risk than an ongoing adaptive 
management condition requiring 
review when unforeseen or undue 
adverse effects are encountered, as a 
result of the operation of the consent. 
Judge Bollard in Gunson accepted the 
Society’s submission that it was not 
possible in relation to a development 
project such as Whangamata Marina to 
predict all fauna that might be on-site, 
particularly where there is a significant 
time lapse between applying for the 
consent and the commencement 
of works. He viewed the essential 
purpose of having fauna management 
plans, to be to ensure that any fauna 
on sites when resource consents 
come to be exercised are identified 
and appropriately managed. It is 
accepted that such plans can provide a 
pragmatic solution, where an adaptive 
management approach can be applied, 
without undue risk. However in terms 
of species for which on site protection 
or translocation is not a viable 
proposition, this approach may carry 
the risk of causing irreversible effects. 
It would be unfortunate if the use of 
adaptive management type conditions 
supplanted the role of a rigorous AEE. 
Once consent is granted and not 
appealed, it confers a right upon the 
owner to carry out the consented 
activities.  Interfering with this right 
is to be treated with caution. Under 
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the RMA the opportunity to prevent 
the operation of the consent is limited. 
Pursuant to ss126 and 132(4) RMA, 
consent may be cancelled if not 
exercised, or upon review, where 
it is found that inaccurate material 
influenced the grant of consent. 
(Director-General of Conservation 
v Marlborough DC, unreported 
Environment Court C113/04).  
As a safeguard, when adaptive 
management-type conditions are 
employed, review conditions are 
attached to the consent pursuant to 
s128 RMA. The use of these conditions 
is central to the employment of an 
adaptive management approach, 
as they enable the conditions to be 
recalibrated to manage the impacts, as 
they are established. Where specified in 
the original consent, review conditions 
enable the consent authority, to review 
conditions of consent to deal with any 
adverse effect on the environment, 
which may arise from the exercise of 
the consent and which it is appropriate 
to deal with at a later stage. Although 
a useful mechanism to reshape 
conditions at a later date, s128 and the 
related s132, do not enable termination 
of the consent. (Minister of Conservation 
v Tasman DC, unreported, High 
Court, Nelson CIV-2003-485-1072, 
9 December 2003, Ronald Young J, 
73-74). Furthermore, when making 
a decision upon the review of 
conditions, the consent authority is 
directed by s131(2)(b) to have regard 
to the matters in s104 and to whether 
the activity allowed by the consent will 
continue to be viable after the change. 
This direction may limit the impact 
of review. It is a further reason for 
supporting the provision of full and 
effective AEEs. The implications of this 
situation will be discussed further in a 
later section of this article.
Although power exists under the 
RMA to take enforcement action 
reliant upon s17 RMA, the general 
duty to avoid adverse effects, it is not 
a section commonly used to restrain 
existing activity and certainly not to 
reverse a constructed development. 
Once a development is consented, 
or construction has commenced, the 
investment and legitimate expectation 
surrounding the development is 
a powerful force to reckon with. 
Furthermore the law is unsettled as 
to whether the remedies available 
pursuant to s314 RMA, in the absence 
of inaccurate information supplied 
with consent, would extend to 
cancellation of the consent (Director 
General of Conservation v Marlborough 
District Council [2004] 3 NZLR 127). 
This is again, a further reason to 
support a rigorous AEE at the outset.
 F ina l ly,  re ly ing  upon 
ecological planning and surveying 
post-consent, but pre-start of 
construction can render fragile 
ecosystems more vulnerable to 
human error. The herbicide spraying 
of potential habitat of moko skink 
is a case in point. Although it could 
happen at any time, it is more likely 
to occur post-consent, as operators 
ready for development. Robust project 
management and vigorous monitoring 
is vital to effective protection of any 
kind.
It is a requirement of s88(2)(b) RMA 
that the detail of an AEE, correspond 
with the size and scale of the effects 
that the activity will have on the 
environment. For a large scale project, 
there is usually a lengthy period 
of lead-in time which enables the 
preparation of a detailed AEE. It 
makes excellent sense for an applicant 
to conscientiously document the 
environmental effects in order to be 
fully prepared for all eventualities 
and this is the practice of many 
major utility companies. Dealing with 
ecological surveys post consent may 
deliver unwanted uncertainty for the 
applicant and may result in costly 
proceedings and delays.
A final issue is the burden that a less 
than adequate AEE can place on 
the general public and government 
agencies such as the Department of 
Conservation. In an environment 
where an order security for costs 
may deter legitimate opposition to 
applications, a rigorous AEE may 
constitute the last line of defence for 
threatened species.
The moko skink case is a useful 
example of problems that may arise 
when development activity intersects 
with wildlife habitat. It appears in 
this situation that the actions of the 
parties involved, have mitigated any 
irreversible impact on the skink in 
this area and that translocation will 
be successful. It must be recorded 
however, that tangata whenua have 
significant concerns relating to the 
entire proceedings and have particular 
concerns relating to activities that 
disturb/and or translocate species 
regarded as taonga.
THE CASE OF THE 
POwELLIPHANTA SNAILS
A second example is the litigation 
stemming from the west coast of the 
South Island, relating to the impact 
of open cast mining and Powelliphanta 
land snails.The decision, Royal Forest 
and Bird Protection Society v Minister 
of Conservation [2006] NZAR at 
paras 21-22, established that habitat 
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destruction resulting in incidental 
killing may equate to a breach of the 
WA, as constituting hunting or killing 
as defined by s2 of the Act. In a related 
2008 decision, Solid Energy New 
Zealand Ltd v The Minister of Energy 
and Ors unreported, High Court, 
Wellington CIV-2007-485-1381, 
Mallon J, 10 December 2008, the 
intersection between the RMA and 
the WA was examined further. The 
decision records that  Solids Energy 
carries out mining pursuant to land 
use consent issued under the RMA and 
pursuant to licences granted under 
the Coal Mines Act 1979 (CMA). As 
the land on which the operations are 
carried out may contain wildlife, the 
permits granted contained conditions 
to protect wildlife, including detailed 
conditions requiring the preparation of 
fauna management plans to facilitate, 
amongst other things, the catching 
and translocation of the snails. The 
decision refers to the reasoning of the 
Environment Court when imposing 
the conditions where the Court stated:
“[132] we acknowledge that 
there is a risk of failure, and thus 
we accept that the conditions 
require close monitoring and 
allow for a regular review of 
the conditions of consent. 
We use an analogy from the 
reasoning in the decision in 
Jackson Bay Mussels Limited 
and Ors v West Coast Regional 
Council in relation to Hector’s 
dolphins. In the event that it is 
found that there is an adverse 
impact on the kiwi or the 
patrickensis snails beyond that 
contemplated in this decision, 
then that is a matter which 
may give rise to the review of 
the consent as a whole. The 
concern of the opponents is 
that by the time the adverse 
consequences of the plan are 
known, the excavation of the 
site will have already occurred 
and the loss of the patrickensis 
and their habitat will be a 
foregone conclusion. ”
Given that a review of condition cannot 
lead to termination of the consent, 
the intent to “review the consent as 
a whole” does not seem particularly 
reassuring. Furthermore, as the 
“opponents” in this case appear to have 
identified, an adaptive management 
approach may allow for the activity or 
part of the activity to proceed, with the 
damage being assessed on an ongoing 
basis. For some species this may be 
appropriate, but for threatened species, 
particularly those with small, discrete 
populations, even limited impact could 
have significant effects on population 
levels. (See for example Drewitt, A.L. 
& Langston, R.H.W., “Assessing the 
impacts of wind farms on birds”, In 
Wind, Fire and Water: Renewable 
Energy and Birds, (2006) Ibis 148 
(Suppl. 1): 29-32).
 Adaptive management is to some 
extent an ongoing experiment, with 
the stakes being particularly high 
for the vulnerable. Factor in human 
error and it could become a lethal 
cocktail. Although it is accepted 
that considerable financial resources 
and scientific expertise may be 
employed in order to limit adverse 
effects on species and achieve sound 
results, where undue risk to species 
is a possibility, the use of adaptive 
management techniques should be 
rigorously controlled. The better 
approach is for the applicant to provide 
a comprehensive AEE, accounting for 
detailed ecological planning, at the 
outset of the application. 
An alternative, or even additional 
approach, is to enable termination 
of the consent upon review. Such an 
option is being promoted in relation to 
proposed legislation for the regulation 
of Environmental Effects in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  The 
Cabinet paper discussing the proposed 
legislation records in the Executive 
Summary:
“17. A precautionary approach 
that allows for the application 
of adaptive management tools 
will be used to mitigate any 
lack of information about 
the marine environment and 
the environmental effects 
of individual activities.   
The provision for adaptive 
management will not restrict 
the ability of the consent 
authority to decline any 
application.  For example, new 
types of activity, if approved, 
could have a staged work 
programme, with stringent 
monitoring requirements and 
the ability to revoke permission 
if the environmental effects 
exceed set levels. ”  
Amendment to s128 RMA could effect 
the adoption of a similar approach 
on land and in the coastal marine 
area. Although it is accepted that 
the EEZ is less extensively explored 
and researched than the territorial 
sea and land, aspects of scientific 
uncertainty are common to all areas. 
This uncertainty combined with a 
precautionary approach, supports 
an option to cancel consent upon 
review, where it is found that effects 
exceed set levels. The principles of 
non-derogation of grant and legitimate 
expectation may impact upon the 
ability to apply any such amendment 
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retrospectively. However in terms of 
property rights and future consents 
the purpose shared by the parties, 
when they entered the relationship, 
would be shaped by limitations of 
the RMA as amended, as would any 
subsequent consent.   It should also 
be noted that the Cabinet Paper 
sounds a caution in terms of the 
use of an adaptive management 
approach and concludes that:
“ T h e r e  a r e  m a n y 
circumstances, such as 
proposals for activities in 
unique or vulnerable areas, 
where adaptive management 
may not be appropriate due 
to the consequences of any 
irreversible effects.” 
The focus of the Solid Energy 
case was not upon this issue, 
but rather upon the question of 
whether, when Solid Energy takes 
steps to protect wildlife pursuant 
to conditions in RMA and CMA 
consents/licences, it is also required 
to obtain authorisation or consent 
under the WA. Solid Energy was 
of the view, that having obtained 
detailed permission under the RMA 
to deal with the wildlife and take 
steps to protect it by translocation, 
that further permits under the WA, 
should not be required. The Court 
was not convinced by this argument, 
particularly as the existing RMA 
consents required, as a condition, 
that any necessary WA permits be 
obtained. However, the court did 
leave open the possibility that in 
certain circumstances, RMA consent 
could constitute lawful authority for 
the purposes of the WA.
In relation to dual permitting the 
court stated, at para 122,  “Whether 
this dual process serves any useful 
purpose when all relevant interests are 
taken into account by the consenting 
authority under the RMA process, or 
merely serves to add to the time and 
cost for the applicant for a consent, is a 
matter for Parliament.” Sympathy can 
be felt for a conscientious applicant 
who has gone to great lengths to 
obtain a consent that provides for 
protection of a species via a detailed 
translocation procedure and then finds 
that additional permits under the WA 
are needed. In the current climate of 
recession and the drive for efficiency 
of procedure, this will no doubt be 
an area targeted by resource users for 
reform. Before adopting such a change 
there are several issues to contemplate. 
Dual permitting under separate 
enactments is not uncommon, 
particularly where the mandates or foci 
of those Acts are different. Commonly 
these processes are complementary. 
Pursuant to s5, the purpose of the 
RMA is the sustainable management 
of natural and physical resources. 
Protection of the habitat of fauna 
is a matter of national importance 
pursuant to s6(c), however, it is but 
one matter of many to be considered, 
and is viewed as accessory to the 
primary purpose. (NZ Rail Ltd v 
Marlborough District Council (HC) 
[1994] NZRMA 70, 85, Greig J.).  In 
this way, protection of fauna may “give 
way” to another matter of national 
importance or to enabling people to 
provide for their social, economic 
and cultural wellbeing, provided 
adverse effects are adequately avoided, 
remedied or mitigated. 
The WA has a more defined focus 
relating to the protection and control 
of wild animals. It can be argued 
that this defined focus will better 
serve the interests of threatened 
species in ensuring their continued 
existence. The decision-maker on WA 
permits, exercises powers delegated 
by either the Director General of 
Conservation or the Minister of 
Conservation and is likely to be 
well versed in species management. 
Al though the Department  of 
Conservation has extensive input into 
reviewing and making submissions 
on resource consents, RMA land 
use consent procedure does not 
vest decision-making power in the 
Department. In a climate where 
biodiversity is under threat both 
globally and nationally, it would be 
prudent to ensure the presence of 
robust measures to protect threatened 
species, in the suite of regulatory 
tools. That is not to say that the law 
could not be improved, but rather 
that in a situation of risk, it is wise 
to have strong checks and balances. 
It can be argued that in terms of 
threatened species protection, it 
would be a retrograde move to enable 
RMA consent to constitute lawful 
authority for the purposes of the WA.
CONCLUSION
 Successful negotiation of 
space shared with humans, is central 
to the continued existence of many 
species of wildlife. In the practice 
of resource management, finding 
workable solutions to the issues 
of shared space is an important 
challenge for all disciplines involved.
